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The Future of International Law Is Domestic
(or, The European Way of Law)
Anne-Marie Slaughter∗
William Burke-White**
International law has traditionally been just that—international. Consisting
of a largely separate set of legal rules and institutions,1 international law has
long governed relationships among states. Under the traditional rules of
international law, the claims of individuals could reach the international plane
only when a state exercised diplomatic protection and espoused the claims of
its nationals in an international forum.2 More recently, international law has
penetrated the once exclusive zone of domestic affairs to regulate the relationships between governments and their own citizens, particularly through the
growing bodies of human rights law and international criminal law.3 But even
in these examples, international law has recognized a clear demarcation between domestic and international politics.
The classic model of international law as separate from the domestic realm
reºects the traditional problems the international legal system sought to address, namely the facilitation of state-to-state cooperation and the treatment
of one state’s nationals by another state. Whether regulating the immunities
of diplomats or the rights of ships on the high seas, the traditional purposes
of international law have been interstate, not intrastate.
∗ Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania School of Law. The authors wish to thank
Larry Helfer and the participants in the Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Colloquium, Feb. 2005, for their
comments and feedback, and Nus Choudhry for invaluable research assistance.
1. This approach is closely linked to the monist view of international law. Monists argue that international law and domestic law are part of the same system, in which international law is hierarchically prior
to domestic law. Dualists, in contrast, claim that international and domestic law are part of two distinct
systems and that domestic law is generally prior to international law. See generally J. G. Starke, Monism
and Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 17 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 66 (1936). While both of these
theories provide important linkages between international law and domestic law, for adherents of either
approach the functions and institutions of international law remain largely at the international level. See
generally id.
2. See Mavromatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 12 (Aug.
30). Yet the decision of a state to espouse its citizen’s claim is one of domestic politics—the state has no
obligation to do so. International law does, however, regulate the right of the state to espouse an individual claim, limiting such rights to cases of “close connection,” usually in the form of “real and effective
nationality” between the state and the citizen. See, e.g., Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4
(Apr. 6).
3. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional Moment,
43 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1 (2002).

328

Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 47

This foundation of international law reºects the principles of Westphalian
sovereignty, often seemingly made up of equal parts myth and rhetoric. In
this conception, the state is a deªned physical territory “within which domestic political authorities are the sole arbiters of legitimate behavior.”4 States
can be part of the international legal system to the degree they choose by
consenting to particular rules. Likewise, they can choose to remain apart, asserting their own sovereignty and eschewing international involvement. Formally, Westphalian sovereignty is the right to be left alone, to exclude, to be
free from any external meddling or interference. But it is also the right to be
recognized as an autonomous agent in the international system, capable of
interacting with other states and entering into international agreements. With
these background understandings of sovereignty, an international legal system, consisting of states and limited by the principle of state consent, emerged.
Today, however, the challenges facing states and the international community alike demand very different responses from and thus new roles for
the international legal system. The processes of globalization and the emergence
of new transnational threats have fundamentally changed the nature of governance and the necessary purposes of international law in the past few years.
From cross-border pollution to terrorist training camps, from refugee ºows
to weapons proliferation, international problems have domestic roots that an
interstate legal system is often powerless to address. To offer an effective response to these new challenges, the international legal system must be able
to inºuence the domestic policies of states and harness national institutions
in pursuit of global objectives.
To create desirable conditions in the international system, from peace, to
health to prosperity, international law must address the capacity and the will
of domestic governments to respond to these issues at their sources. In turn,
the primary terrain of international law must shift—and is already shifting
in many instances—from independent regulation above the national state to
direct engagement with domestic institutions. The three principal forms of
such engagement are strengthening domestic institutions, backstopping them,
and compelling them to act.
The most striking feature of this conception of international law is a direct emphasis on shaping or inºuencing political outcomes within sovereign
states in accordance with international legal rules. Even in 1945, the drafters
of the U.N. Charter still maintained the classical position that international
law and institutions shall not “intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”5 Today, however, the objectives of
international law and the very stability of the international system itself depend critically on domestic choices previously left to the determination of
national political processes—whether to enforce particular rules, establish institutions, or even engage in effective governance. By ensuring that national
4. See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy 20 (1999).
5. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
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governments actually function in pursuit of collective aims, international
law is starting to play a far more active role in shaping these national political choices. Assuming that current political, economic, and technological trends
continue, the future effectiveness of international law will turn on its ability
to inºuence and alter domestic politics.
These functions of international law are already well known to the members of the European Union (“EU”). Indeed, in extending membership to ten
new countries over the course of the past decade, the EU has relied on EU
law as its primary tool of reform and socialization.6 Even among the original
member states, EU institutions continue to perform the types of backstopping, strengthening, and mandating functions described here. Europeans themselves are coming to recognize these uses of law; a new generation of European policy thinkers has openly proclaimed the virtues of the European way
of law.7
Some may, of course, argue that these new functions of international law
have no applicability outside the European context in which they were ªrst
embraced.8 Yet each of the three means through which international law is
coming to inºuence domestic outcomes—strengthening domestic institutions,
backstopping national governance, and compelling domestic action—is spreading beyond the Continent.
To the extent that what we describe as the “European way of law” is already evident both within the EU and now in a growing number of other contexts, this Article describes an important reorganization of the means and
mechanisms through which international law operates. Our argument goes
further, however, by suggesting that these new mechanisms of international
law have the power to make the system as a whole far more effective. We therefore move beyond description and prediction to prescription, suggesting
ways that the European way of law should become the future of international
law writ large.
We also recognize, however, the potential dangers in current trends. As
we emphasize in the conclusion, our vision of the principal future functions
of international law assumes an intensive interaction between international
law and domestic politics. But domestic politicians can manipulate international legal institutions and mandates to serve their own purposes, such as
jailing political dissidents as part of complying with a Security Council resolution requiring domestic action against terrorism. More broadly, the basic

6. See generally Mark Leonard, Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century 43–46 (2005).
7. See, e.g., id.; Gráinne de Búrca, Beyond the Charter: How Enlargement Has Enlarged the Human Rights
Policy of the European Union, 27 Fordham Int’l L.J. 679, 680 (2004) (arguing that a similar role of law is
generating a “more general and comprehensive human rights policy” within the EU).
8. See, e.g., Eric Posner & John Yoo, Reply to Helfer and Slaughter, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 957, 966 (2005)
(“There is no reason to think that a court that works for Europe, where political and legal institutions in
most countries are of high quality, would work for a world political community that lacks the same level
of cohesion and integration. Whatever one thinks about the EU, it is nothing like the international
community.”).
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positivist foundations of international law, requiring states to freely accept
such interference in domestic politics, raise the possibility of manipulation
and even imposition of such “acceptance” as a result of power disparities.
Part I of this Article identiªes a new set of global threats and actual and
potential responses, including the EU’s uses of law to transform new members “from the inside out.” Part II argues that the future relevance, power,
and potential of international law lie in its ability to backstop, strengthen,
and compel domestic law and institutions. Part III examines the potential
pitfalls and dangers of these new functions of international law. Finally, Part
IV contrasts our analysis with other recent efforts to blur the boundaries between the international and domestic spheres, noting that what is distinctive about our claim is not the intermingling of two kinds of law, but rather
the impact of international law on domestic politics and vice versa.
I. New Threats, New Responses
Rules can reºect and embody aspirations for a better world. Alternatively,
and equally likely, rules respond to concrete problems. The changing nature
of international legal rules today responds to a new generation of worldwide
problems. The most striking feature of these problems is that they arise from
within states rather than from state actors themselves.
Examples abound: the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were
launched by a group of nonstate actors operating from within the territory of
Afghanistan;9 the massive ethnic crimes in Rwanda, Congo, and Sudan are,
in large part, the product of rebel forces within states;10 the most dangerous
examples of nuclear proliferation can often be attributed to nonstate criminal networks such as those of A. Q. Kahn.11 The 2004 Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change identiªes problems of intrastate origin such as “poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation . . . civil war, genocide and other large scale atrocities
. . . nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, terrorism, [and]
transnational organized crime” as among the core threats facing the international community today.12
More often than not, the origins of these threats can be addressed directly
only by domestic governments that have the jurisdictional entitlements, police
power, and institutional capability to act directly against them. Arresting
9. See generally Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S., The 9/11 Commission Report (2004).
10. See, e.g., Josias Semujanga, Origins of the Rwandan Genocide (2003); Robert B. Edgerton, The Troubled Heart of Africa: A History of the Congo (2002); Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry
on Darfur, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General
(Jan. 25, 2005), http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf.
11. See William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, Pakistani’s Nuclear Black Market Seen as Offering Deepest
Secrets of Building Bomb, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 2005, at A7.
12. Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World:
Our Shared Responsibility 2, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
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criminals or terrorists, securing nuclear materials, and preventing pollution
are within the traditional province of domestic law. The result is that the
external security of many states depends on the ability of national governments
to maintain internal security sufªcient to establish and enforce national law.
Where states are strong enough to combat these internal threats directly,
international law can and must play a critical coordinating role to ensure that
governments cooperate in addressing threats before they span borders. Far too
frequently, however, domestic governments lack the will or the capacity to
adequately respond to these challenges. Since the early 1990s, the number of
states unable to effectively govern their territories has increased.13 As Francis
Fukuyama afªrms, “[s]ince the end of the Cold War, weak or failing states
have arguably become the single most important problem for the international order . . . . Weak or failing states commit human rights abuses, provoke humanitarian disasters, drive massive waves of immigration, and attack
their neighbors.”14
Where national governments are unable or unwilling to address the origins of these threats themselves, international law may step in to help build
their capacity or stiffen their will. This use of international law moves well
beyond both its classical deªnition, as “the rights subsisting between nations,”15 and its more modern conception, as, in part, regulating the conduct
of states toward their own citizens.16 Where human rights law identiªes a
set of clear prohibitions on government behavior, coupled with a set of positive aspirations toward economic, social, and cultural rights, these new international legal rules seek actively to shape not only domestic law but also
the domestic political environment to enable and enhance domestic government
action. The result is far more invasive, but also potentially transformative.
For many countries, ranging from the United States to Russia, from the countries of the Middle East to those of Africa, this new use of international law
is also far more frightening.
This new model springs from a conception of international law spreading
outward from Europe. The Treaty of Westphalia, ending the bloody Thirty
Years War with the principle of cuius regio, eius religio,17 has given way to the
Treaty of Rome, ending a century of bloody intra-European wars with a con-

13. See Jeremy W. Weinstein et al., On the Brink, Weak States and US National Security:
A Report of the Commission for Weak States and US National Security 9–12 (2004) (describing recent incidences of state failure); see also Stuart E. Eizenstat & John Edward Porter, Weak States Are a
US Security Threat, Christian Sci. Monitor, June 29, 2004, at 9 (“In those states [Iraq and Haiti] and
others like them—Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, and possibly Pakistan—where poor states lose control,
it’s often Americans who pay the price.”).
14. Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century 92–93 (2004).
15. Emmerich de Vattel described international law in the 1750s as “the rights subsisting between
nations or states, and the obligations correspondent to those rights.” Emmerich de Vattel, The Law
of Nations Preliminaries § 3 (Joseph Chitty et al. trans. & ed. 1883) (1758).
16. See generally Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 3.
17. “Whose territory, his religion.”
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cept of pooled sovereignty that has steadily expanded and deepened in the
contemporary EU. As the EU’s legal system has evolved, the prime purpose
of the European Court of Justice and even of the Commission has been less
to create and impose EU law as international law than to spur national courts
and regulatory agencies to embrace and enforce EU law as national law.
Moreover, as Mark Leonard writes in his provocative new book Why Europe
Will Run the 21st Century, “Europe’s weapon is the law.”18 He describes Europe’s
power in the world as “a transformative power,”19 rooted in a strategy of
democratization that is based on requiring candidate countries to “swallow
all 80,000 pages of European laws and adapt their own legislation to accommodate them,” as well as then accepting continual monitoring by EU ofªcials
to ensure that they are in fact living up to their new commitments.20 The
result has been a “rebuilding [of] these countries from the bottom up.”21 Indeed, “[t]he European model is the political equivalent of the strategy of the
Jesuits: if you change the country at the beginning, you have it for life.”22
Note the precise way that European law works in this equation. For all
the 80,000 pages of regulations, the EU Council of Ministers and the EU
Commission issue directives that specify ends rather than means. It is up to
national legislatures and courts to decide precisely how the member state in
question will fulªll a particular directive. Once those laws are passed, EU
institutions—the Court and the Commission—look over national shoulders
to ensure that they actually do what they commit to do. This European way
of law is precisely the role that we postulate for international law generally
around the world.23
18. Leonard, supra note 6, at 35.
19. Id. at 5 (quoting Richard Youngs, Engagement: Sharpening European Inºuence, in Global Europe
Report 2: New Terms of Engagement 1, 5 (Richard Youngs ed., 2004)).
20. Leonard, supra note 6, at 45.
21. Id. Others have suggested that these changes are, at times, imposed instead from the top down,
and may be indicative of a democratic deªcit in the EU. See, e.g., Giandomenico Majone, Europe’s Democratic Deªcit: A Question of Standards, 4 Eur. L.J. 5 (1998) (observing that the “democratic deªcit . . . refers
to the legitimacy problems of non-majoritarian institutions, i.e., institutions which by design are not
directly accountable to the voters or to their elected representatives”); Jeremy Rabkin, Is EU Policy Eroding the Sovereignty of Non-Member States?, 1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 273, 273 (2000) (arguing that the EU is based
on a “systematic program of eroding or reconªguring national sovereignty”). For a perspective on the EU
that rejects the danger of the democratic deªcit and accords more closely with our vision, see Andrew
Moravcsik, In Defense of the Democratic Deªcit: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union, 40 J. Common
Market Stud. 603 (2002).
22. Leonard, supra note 6, at 45–46.
23. Beyond the EU system, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) has repeatedly forced
European governments to change their domestic laws governing issues from prosecution of criminals to
admitting homosexuals into the armed services. Governments are all entitled to a “margin of appreciation” in reconciling their domestic laws and practices with their treaty obligations, but the ECtHR is
there to ensure that the margin does not grow too wide. See, e.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1976) (applying the margin of appreciation to freedom of speech); Jersild v.
Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994) (holding the margin of appreciation breached in the prosecution of a journalist for racist speech); Lustig-Prean & Beckett v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 548,
587 (1999) (holding that the plaintiffs were wrongly discharged “on the grounds of their homosexuality”
and requiring a change in UK policy toward sexual orientation in the military); Zana v. Turkey (No. 57),
1997-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 2533 (holding that Turkey has a margin of appreciation in regulating incitement
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Espen Barth Eide, a former state secretary in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, writes that the “EU’s ‘soft’ intervention in the ‘domestic affairs’ of EU
member states is almost an everyday experience.”24 This is the hallmark of
EU-style “post-Westphalian sovereignty,” described so memorably by Robert
Cooper, a top aide to Javier Solana, in The Breaking of Nations.25 Eide and other
leading European security strategists openly call for the extension of regional
“integrative projects” based on the EU in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.
The European Security Strategy, proposed by Javier Solana26 and passed by
the European Council in December 2003, fell short of openly embracing this
vision, but recognized that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(“ASEAN”), the Southern Cone Common Market (“MERCOSUR”), and the
African Union “make an important contribution to a more orderly world.”27
Spreading the European way of law beyond Europe, a process that is already underway, requires a broader rethinking of the functions of international law. As in Europe, the focus of a growing number of international rules is
no longer interstate relations; it is increasingly governments’ capacity and
will to act in prescribed ways toward their own peoples. The result is a growing
interaction between international law and domestic politics, in ways that have
lasting implications for both.
II. The Future Functions of International Law
The all-too-often inadequate domestic response to transnational threats
has three separate but related causes: a lack of domestic governance capacity,
a lack of domestic will to act, and new problems that exceed the ordinary
ability of states to address. International law has key leverage points to help
improve the response of domestic governments in each of these three ways.
International legal rules and institutions can enhance the capacity and effectiveness of domestic institutions. If properly designed and structured they
can help backstop domestic political and legal groups trying to comply with
international legal obligations. Finally, they can even compel or mandate
action at the national level in response to a global threat. The following sec-

by Kurdish politicians).
24. Espen Barth Eide, Introduction: The Role of the EU in Fostering “Effective Multilateralism,” in Effective Multilateralism: Europe, Regional Security and a Revitalized UN 1, 1–10 (Espen Barth
Eide ed., 2004).
25. See generally Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the 21st
Century (2003).
26. Javier Solana is the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union and the European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Should the proposed EU Constitution eventually enter into force, he is expected to be appointed Foreign Minister of the EU. The European Council is the “main decision-making body of the EU” and is composed of the ministers of the
member states for any particular subject area. See Council of the European Union, http://ue.eu.int/cms3_
fo/showPage.asp?id=242&lang=EN&mode=g (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
27. Javier Solana, A Secure Europe in a Better World—The European Security Strategy
9 (2003), http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.
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tions will examine each of these ways that international law can and in some
cases is beginning to play a new role in domestic governance.
A. Strengthening Domestic Institutions
A primary limitation of the international system is the weakness of government institutions in so many states all over the world. Due to violence, poverty, disease, corruption, and limited technology or training, national governments all too often lack the resources, skills, and ability to provide adequate solutions to local and transnational problems. Examples are numerous:
state failure in Somalia in the early 1990s, devastation from natural catastrophes like the 2004 tsunami, civil wars such as that in Angola from 1998
to 2003, or the rampant corruption all too evident in Russia in the mid1990s. A 2004 report of the Commission on Weak States and U.S. National
Security highlighted as a key national security concern the need to assist states
“whose governments are unable to do the things that their own citizens and
the international community expect from them: offer protection from internal and external threats, deliver basic health services and education, and
provide institutions that respond to the legitimate demands and needs of the
population.”28 Improving the capacity of government ofªcials of all sorts—
regulators, judges, and legislators—to actually govern is paramount.29 Francis Fukuyama observes: “For the post–September 11th period, the chief issue
for global politics will not be how to cut back on stateness but how to build
it up.”30 International law has an important role to play in this process.
A critically important tool in strengthening the institutions of national
governments is the formalization and inclusion of “government networks” as
mechanisms of global governance. These largely voluntary networks link together domestic governmental ofªcials from different countries in similar ªelds
or spheres of responsibility. Such networks provide an effective means to
harness national regulatory systems in the pursuit of common, international
goals. Such networks can help harmonize national policies and can support
the efforts of domestic ofªcials vis-à-vis their own governments.
These networks of national government ofªcials of all kinds are already
operating across borders to regulate individuals and corporations operating in a
global economy, combat global crime, and address common problems on a
global scale.31 They perform a range of functions that enhance the effectiveness of domestic governance. They build trust and establish relationships
among their participants that create incentives to establish a good reputation and avoid a bad one. They regularly exchange information about their
own activities and develop databases of best practices, or, in the judicial sphere,
28. Weinstein et al., supra note 13, at 6.
29. For a discussion of the importance of building state capacity, see Problematic Sovereignty:
Contested Rules and Political Possibilities (Stephen Krasner ed., 2001).
30. Fukuyama, supra note 14, at 120.
31. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004).
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different approaches to common legal issues. Finally, they offer technical assistance and professional socialization to members—whether regulators, judges, or
legislators—from less developed nations.32
If their existence and capacities were more widely recognized, government
networks could do far more to strengthen domestic governance. Building the
basic capacity to govern in countries that often lack sufªcient material and
human resources to pass, implement, and apply laws effectively is itself an important and valuable consequence of government networks. Regulatory, judicial, and legislative networks all engage in capacity-building directly, through
training and technical assistance programs, and indirectly, through their
provision of information, coordinated policy solutions, and moral support to
their members. In effect, government networks communicate to their members everywhere the message that the Zimbabwean chief justice understood
when he was under siege and commented, “I am not alone.”33
The best examples of transnational networks strengthening domestic governance may be in the area of regulatory export. Kal Raustiala offers a number of examples of regulatory export in the securities, environmental, and
antitrust areas. According to one securities regulator he interviewed, a prime
outcome of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission networking is the
dissemination of “the ‘regulatory gospel’ of U.S. securities law,” including:
“strict insider trading rules; mandatory registration with a governmental
agency of public securities issues; a mandatory disclosure system; issuer liability
regarding registration statements and offering documents; broad antifraud provisions; and government oversight of brokers, dealers, exchanges, etc.”34 In
effect, U.S. regulatory agencies make their own jobs easier by offering technical assistance and training to their foreign counterparts, because strong foreign authorities with compatible securities, environmental, and antitrust
regimes will effectively extend the reach of U.S. regulators.
The EU has enjoyed similar advantages through the International Competition Network (“ICN”). As a result, a growing number of countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, are copying the EU approach to competition policy
rather than the U.S. model.35 The opening conference of the ICN, led by the
head of the German competition agency, was held in Italy in 2002. The
network describes itself as “a project-oriented, consensus-based, informal network of antitrust agencies from developed and developing countries that will
32. For examples of this phenomenon among judges, see Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 (2002);
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 1103 (2000). For discussion in the regulatory context, see Slaughter, supra note 31.
33. Slaughter, supra note 31, at 99.
34. Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law, 6 J. Int’l Econ. L.
841, 843 (2003).
35. See Slaughter, supra note 31, at 175. Although the United States originally pushed the idea of a
global network of antitrust regulators under the Clinton administration, the Bush administration has
proven less enthusiastic. The lack of U.S. engagement in the process presently gives the EU considerable
inºuence on global regulatory development.
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address antitrust enforcement and policy issues of common interest and formulate proposals for procedural and substantive convergence through a resultsoriented agenda and structure.”36
Other examples of such networks strengthening domestic capacity in the
economic arena include the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision37 and
the International Organization of Securities Commissioners, which have been
inºuential in enhancing the ability of national governments to regulate securities and maintain independent central banks.38 The net result of these
networks is twofold: ªrst, convergence toward a set of standardized practices
at the national level and, second, the creation of greater domestic regulatory
capacity in participating nations.
It should not be assumed that regulatory expertise ºows only from developed to developing countries. At least in the judicial arena, European and
Canadian courts have learned as much from South African and Indian courts
as vice versa.39 Among regulators, local experience with a wide range of
problems can count for a great deal in the exchange of best practices.
Governments can do much more to strengthen domestic governance through
government networks. For example: strengthening the International Network
for Environmental Cooperation and Enforcement, composed of environmental
ofªcials; expanding the inclusivity and representativeness of global ªnancial
and leadership networks (such as expanding the G-8 to the G-20); creating a
Global Justice Network of justice ministers; creating a Global Human Rights
Network of the government ofªcials responsible for human rights conditions;
and bringing networks of legislators together under the auspices of the United
Nations and other international institutions. Such networks must be provided with both concrete tasks and the resources to accomplish them, enabling states to work together to strengthen both collective and individual
governance capacity.
As the front line of authority, national government ofªcials exercise an array of coercive and persuasive powers largely unmatched by international institutions. National governments, by operating through government networks,
can bring these same powers to bear on behalf of international legal obliga36. International Competition Network, Memorandum on the Establishment and Operation of the
International Competition Network, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/mou.pdf (last visited
Feb. 26, 2006).
37. See David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 Chi. J. Int’l
L. 547, 595 (2005).
38. Id. at 561; see also International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2002 Ann. Rep. 22 (2002),
http://dev.iosco.org/annual_report/PDF/IOSCO_2002.pdf.
39. For a general discussion, see Slaughter, supra note 31, at 65–103. For an example of crosscitation by the South African Constitutional Court, see State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC)
(S. Afr.). For an example of borrowing by a developed country, see Regina v. Bow St. Metro Stipendiary
Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999), in which the English
House of Lords cited to no fewer than twenty-one foreign judgments of countries including the United
States, France, Israel, and Chile. The fact that such borrowing runs in both directions—from the developed world to the developing world and back again—goes far to counter the criticism that such networks
are merely a form of neo-colonial imposition.
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tions. They can coerce, cajole, ªne, order, regulate, legislate, horse-trade,
bully, or use whatever other methods that produce results within their political system. They are not subject to coercion at the transgovernmental level;
on the contrary, they are likely to perceive themselves as choosing a speciªc
course of action freely and deliberately. Yet, having decided, for whatever
reasons, to adopt a particular code of best practices, to coordinate policy in a
particular way, to accept the decision of a supranational tribunal, or even simply
to join what seems to be an emerging international consensus on a particular
issue, they can implement that decision within the limits of their own domestic power.
The international legal system could harness the power of transgovernmental networks much more effectively than it does currently. For example,
international law could more explicitly recognize the role of such networks
and the soft regulations they often produce. Hard legal instruments could mandate or facilitate the creation of transnational networks in a range of areas of
critical state weakness such as justice and human rights. Where the weakness of a particular government in a functional area poses a threat to international order, the U.N. Security Council could require state participation in
such a network. Government networks offer an important tool to improve
state capacity. Actors within the international legal system would be well
served to partner with such networks and more directly integrate them into
larger international legal frameworks.
Once again, the international legal system would be taking a leaf from the
EU’s book in this regard. Most EU law gets made and implemented through
transgovernmental networks of EU ofªcials, from ministers on down. Indeed, Mark Leonard describes the EU as “a decentralised network that is owned
by its member-states.”40 Reaching outside the borders of Europe, the EU has
sought to extend the network model to the Middle East and North Africa
through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.41
Beyond government networks, Stephen Krasner suggests that international law and institutions can strengthen state capacity by engaging in
processes of shared sovereignty with national governments. Such shared sovereignty “involves the creation of institutions for governing speciªc issue areas
within a state—areas over which external and internal actors voluntarily
share authority.”42 Examples of these arrangements include the creation of special hybrid courts in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and, possibly, Cambodia, involving a mix of international and domestic law and judges. Similarly, a pro40. Leonard, supra note 6, at 23 (citing Manuel Castells, The End of Millennium (2000)).
41. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also known as the Barcelona Process, is a “wide framework
of political, economic and social relations between the Member States of the European Union and Partners of the Southern Mediterranean” launched in Barcelona in 1995. European Union, Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership/Barcelona Process, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed (last visited Mar. 9,
2006).
42. Stephen D. Krasner, Building Democracy After Conºict: The Case for Shared Sovereignty, 16 J. Democracy, Jan. 2005, at 69, 76.
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posed oil pipeline agreement between Chad and the World Bank would involve shared control and governance.43 Such shared sovereignty, Krasner
claims, can “gird new political structures with more expertise, better-crafted
policies, and guarantees against abuses of power” onto weak or failing states.44
Even within a more traditional framework, the international legal system
can employ a range of mechanisms to strengthen the hand of domestic governments. Legal instruments and codes of international best practices can set
standards to give national governments benchmarks for enhancing their own
capability.45 International institutions can provide aid and assistance speciªcally
targeted for the domestic institutions of the recipient state.
International ªnancial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund
(“IMF”) and the World Bank may play a particularly powerful role in building domestic capacity. Conditionality requirements give these bodies strong
inºuence over domestic outcomes. The IMF’s success in enhancing the capabilities of domestic governments is much debated,46 but the World Bank
may have a better track record.47 Part of the Bank’s strategy in Africa has
been to “put countries in the driver’s seat” with a “platform of strong public
capacity: capacity to formulate policies; capacity to build consensus; capacity
to implement reform; and capacity to monitor results, learn lessons, and
adapt accordingly.”48 Whatever their successes and failures to date, the IMF
and the World Bank have signiªcant leverage to enhance domestic government capacity. What they need is far more input from borrower countries, or
at least reformers and political activists in borrower countries, about how
best to achieve this goal.
Incorporating these types of mechanisms into future legal regimes as a means
of promoting domestic capacity-building must be an ongoing priority. These
mechanisms include building government networks, providing technical assistance, setting benchmarks and standards, or encouraging other forms of co43. See generally id.
44. Id. at 70.
45. In the ªeld of judicial independence, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
provides a set of such benchmarks. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 9–11,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Additionally, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
offers further clariªcation and a potential legal testing ground. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
46. For two sides of this debate, see Randall Stone, Lending Credibility: The International
Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition 233–34 (2002) (arguing that IMF conditionality is appropriate and beneªcial) and James Vreeland, The IMF and Economic Development
160–65 (2003) (suggesting that IMF conditionality may retard domestic development).
47. See Poul Engberg-Pedersen & Brian Levy, Building State Capacity in Africa: Learning from Performance and Results, in Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons 87
(Brian Levy & Sahr Kpundeh eds., 2004) (discussing the role of the World Bank in enhancing state capacity in Africa); see also Joel D. Barkan et al., Emerging Legislatures: Institutions of Horizontal Accountability,
in Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons 233–34 (Brian Levy
& Sahr Kpundeh eds., 2004) (discussing increased awareness across anglophone Africa of developments in
peer legislatures as a possible result of World Bank initiatives).
48. Frannie A. Léautier & Callisto Madavo, Foreword to Building State Capacity in Africa: New
Approaches, Emerging Lessons, at v (Brian Levy & Sahr Kpundeh eds., 2004).
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operation. Abram and Antonia Chayes have explained how this can be done
through a “managerial model” of compliance.49 According to this model, the
task of maximizing compliance with a given set of international rules is a
task more of management than of enforcement, ensuring that all parties know
what is expected of them, that they have the capacity to comply, and that
they receive the necessary assistance. To the degree Chayes and Chayes are correct,50 formal international legal regimes must recognize and promote the
capacity-building needs of domestic governance through government networks, technical assistance, benchmarks and standards, or other forms of cooperation.
More broadly, the success of many policies at the international level depends on political choices at the national level, for example, choices concerning the allocation of resources or the establishment of particular institutions.
The effectiveness of international law may thus depend on its ability to shape
political outcomes and institutional structures within states. At the same
time, however, a feedback loop from domestic to international institutions
becomes crucial for both accountability and effectiveness. Thus the various
mechanisms canvassed above to strengthen domestic government institutions must be carefully designed.
B. Backstopping Domestic Government
A second means through which international law can foster more effective
domestic governance is by backstopping domestic institutions where they
fail to act. In some ways, this idea is not new at all, but rather follows from a
long intellectual tradition. Without developed international institutions
such as the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), cooperation among the
criminal justice mechanisms of states provided a primitive form of backstopping by ensuring that some state would prosecute an accused criminal
even if the territorial state of the crime failed to act. Indeed, as early as 1625,
Hugo Grotius recognized that the domestic courts of various states could
backstop one another. Referring to an early form of the prosecute or extradite requirement, Grotius observed: “[I]t seems reasonable, that the State
where the convicted Offender lives or has taken Shelter, should, upon Application being made to it, either punish the demanded person according to his
Demerits, or else deliver him up to be treated at the Discretion of the in-

49. Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty 3 (1995).
50. This model is distinct both in underlying assumptions and in the resultant variables that govern
state compliance from carrot-and-stick or norm-socialization approaches. See, e.g., George W. Downs et
al., Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?, 50 Int’l Org. 379 (1996) (offering a
carrot-and-stick model); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, International Law and State Socialization:
Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges, 54 Duke L.J. 983 (2005) (linking compliance to state
socialization); Harold H. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 181 (1996) (suggesting the
importance of norm internalization). These alternate theories of compliance produce considerably different prescriptions for how international law may best alter state behavior.
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jured party.”51 Centuries later, in the early 1920s, M. Maurice Travers developed the concept of “la superposition des compétences législatives concurrentes,” suggesting that the layering of overlapping jurisdiction of a number of states
would allow national courts to reinforce one another.52 What is new today is
that international institutions—rather than the national courts of third states—
are making a conscious effort to backstop their national counterparts. Structural rules that explicitly seek to further this backstopping function are now
embedded in the very statutes of international tribunals and institutions.
The most obvious example of international law as a backstop is the complementarity provision of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court. The ICC is designed to operate only where national courts fail to act
as a ªrst line means of prosecution. Article 17 of the Rome Statute provides
that the Court shall determine a case is inadmissible if “the case is being
investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless
the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution.”53 The ICC can step in and provide a second line of defense in
cases where domestic institutions fail “due to a total or substantial collapse
or unavailability of its national judicial system,”54 or where a state is unwilling to prosecute “independently or impartially.”55 In other words, if the United
States or Iraq were a member of the ICC and both states proved unable or
unwilling to prosecute fully all members of the military involved in the
abuses at Abu Ghraib, the ICC would have jurisdiction.
Other forms of international institutional design may similarly result in a
backstopping function. In various human rights courts, the requirement that
individuals ªrst exhaust local remedies gives states—and particularly their
domestic courts—an incentive to reach conclusions acceptable to the international institution so that the international court need not intervene to review
the case.56 Similarly, the dispute resolution mechanisms of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) have served as an international backstop

51. 2 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace 1062 (Richard Tuck trans., Liberty Fund
2005) (1625).
52. M. Maurice Travers, Le droit penal international et sa mise en oeuvre en temps de
paix et en temps de guerre (1922). The key to Travers’ argument is that concurrent legislative authority could, in turn, empower the judicial institutions of a number of states to act against any given
criminal and thereby create overlapping judicial authority without the need for a formal international
tribunal.
53. Rome Statute, supra note 45, art. 17(1).
54. Id. art. 17(3).
55. Id. art. 17(2).
56. Article 35 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that “[t]he Court may only
deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted.” European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 35(1), Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5,
213 U.N.T.S. 222; see also Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art.
46, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (providing, “[a]dmission by the Commission
of a petition or communication lodged in accordance with Articles 44 or 45 shall be subject to the following requirements . . . that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in
accordance with generally recognized principles of international law”).
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for domestic resolution of antidumping cases.57 Under NAFTA, international arbitral panels are given the authority to review domestic administrative decisions and can remand decisions back to the issuing agency with guidance on acceptable outcomes. If the agency issues an acceptable ruling, no
further action is taken. Yet, if the panels remain unsatisªed with the agency’s
response, they can issue a further ruling and remand the case yet again.58 Like
the Rome Statute’s complementarity regime, this remand procedure gives
domestic institutions within NAFTA countries an incentive to act ªrst and
to get it right. Where they fail to do so, the international process provides a
backstop.
The actual effect of such backstopping provisions in international institutional design is twofold.59 First, and most obvious, is the provision of a second line of defense when national institutions fail. Second, and potentially
more powerful, is the ability of the international process to catalyze action at
the national level. This second effect most often occurs when a domestic legal or political process exists that could be utilized, should the domestic
government decide to do so, but government ofªcials, or at least some powerful group of such ofªcials, deem that the political or ªnancial costs of domestic action outweigh the beneªts. In such cases the existence of an international tribunal with concurrent jurisdiction can provide structural incentives that shift the cost-beneªt calculation and result in the use of a domestic process that would otherwise have been neglected. The political beneªts
of adjudicating matters domestically rather than giving jurisdiction to an
international tribunal over which domestic ofªcials have little or no control
creates new incentives to act locally.
The ICC already appears to be having such a catalytic effect in two of the
ªrst situations it is investigating: the Democratic Republic of Congo, and
the Darfur region of Sudan. In the wake of the ICC Prosecutor’s 2003 announcement of an investigation in Congo, a range of efforts were initiated
by certain elements within the Congolese government to reform the Congolese judiciary so as to be able to assert primacy over the ICC and undertake
57. The 1988 Canadian-American Free Trade Agreement and the more recent NAFTA both contain
provisions for the creation of international panels to review the legality of administrative decisions with
respect to antidumping and countervailing duty obligations. See Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can., ch.
19, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281; North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1904(1),
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (“each Party shall replace judicial review of ªnal antidumping and countervailing duty determinations with bi-national panel review”). Though not a traditional international
court or arbitration tribunal, these panels act in a judicial capacity and issue decisions binding on state
parties. Certain non-traditional aspects of the panels include the fact that domestic judicial review is not
completely foreclosed. See Judith Goldstein, International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North
American “Unfair” Trade Laws, 50 Int’l Org. 541, 546 (1996).
58. See Goldstein, supra note 57, at 551.
59. The potential for international institutions to produce these backstopping effects will often depend on the international institution having jurisdiction over the state in question or individuals within
that state. After all, these effects often arise as a result of the threat of potential international adjudication. Where national governments have refused to accept the jurisdiction of international courts, such
effects will be limited.
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national proceedings.60 Similarly, after the Prosecutor opened an investigation in Darfur, local courts, though of questionable legitimacy, were established to initiate domestic proceedings.61 The ICC Prosecutor has himself
suggested that complementarity may encourage domestic prosecutions. As
he argued upon his swearing-in as the Court’s ªrst Prosecutor, “the absence
of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of
national institutions, would be a major success.”62
International legal institutions operating as a backstop need not be limited to purely international courts. Adjudication in foreign domestic courts
may likewise enhance the willingness of national judiciaries in territorial
states to act themselves. The recent advances by Chilean courts toward the
prosecution of Augusto Pinochet is, in part, due to the international community—acting largely through the Spanish and English judiciaries—getting
serious about ensuring accountability for his crimes.63 The prosecution by
Spain and the proceedings in England64—though they did not result in a
conviction—made clear to the Chileans that other options existed if they

60. Reform efforts to date have included attempts to reunify the divided judiciary through nationwide
judicial conferences, establishing commissions on legislative reform, and launching a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Interview by Yuriko Kuga, Leslie Medema, and Adrian Alvarez with Honorius
Kisimba-Ngoy, Minister of Justice, Dem. Rep. Congo, in Kinshasa (Oct. 29, 2003). According to the
Director of the Cabinet to the Minister of Human Rights, one “local commission [is] studying how to
adapt the ICC to the DRC.” Interview by Yuriko Kuga, Leslie Medema, and Adrian Alvarez with Olela
Okondji, Director of the Cabinet to the Minister of Human Rights, Dem. Rep. Congo, in Kinshasa (Oct.
29, 2003). Similarly, “a permanent committee within the Ministry [of Justice has been established] for
reforming the domestic law” and is “learning how to implement the ICC” crimes into domestic law. The
Commission’s formal name is the Commission Permanente de Réforme du Droit Congolais. Id. A Truth
and Reconciliation Commission grew out of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and is written into the new
interim constitution. Constitution de la Transition, Journal Ofªciel de la République Démocratique du Congo, 44 année, 5 Avril 2003, art. 154 (“Les Institutions d’appui à la démocratie sont: . . .
La Commission vérité et réconciliation.”). Despite the consideration of a number of draft laws, as of early
2004, an organic law for the commission has yet to be adopted. Interview with Dr. Kuye Wadonda, President
of the Truth and Reconciliation Comm’n, Dem. Rep. Congo, in Kinshasa (Oct. 28, 2003). For a more
detailed discussion, see William W. Burke-White, Complementarity in Practice: The International Criminal
Court as Part of a System of Multi-Level Global Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 18 Leiden J.
Int’l L. 557 (2005).
61. See Sudan Insists Own Courts Must Try Darfur Crimes, Sudan Trib., Jan. 10, 2006, http://sudantribune.
com/article.php3?id_article=13485.
62. Louis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, ICC, Statement at the Ceremony for the Solemn Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (June 16, 2003), http://www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/030616_moreno_ocampo_english_ªnal.pdf. Similarly, an expert paper published by the Ofªce of the Prosecutor notes: “The complementarity regime serves as a mechanism to
encourage and facilitate the compliance of States with their primary responsibility to investigate and
prosecute core crimes.” International Criminal Court, Ofªce of the Prosecutor, Informal
Expert Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in Practice 3 (2003), http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/
organs/otp/complementarity.pdf.
63. The Chilean Supreme Court has recently ruled that Pinochet may stand trial domestically for international crimes against Chilean citizens committed during his rule. See David Sugarman, Will Pinochet
Ever Answer to the People of Chile?, Times (London), Sept. 14, 2004, at 10.
64. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1
A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999).
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themselves refused to prosecute and may have bolstered the willingness of
Chilean courts to hold Pinochet accountable.65
The backstopping effect of international institutions will take different
forms and often be case speciªc. Sometimes, the international institution will
generate incentives for domestic governmental authorities to act at home as
an alternative to international prosecution. At other times, particularly where
powerful actors within a national government lack the political will to act at
home, the international institution may alter the balance in a domestic power
struggle, strengthening the hand of those national ofªcials who want to act.
Alternatively, where the domestic government truly lacks the capacity to
act, the international institution can backstop domestic courts by genuinely
providing another forum. In any of these situations the international institution directly affects domestic government decisions, changing the incentives
for domestic action and providing a second, international, forum for legal
action.66 It becomes a tacit actor in domestic political processes, pressuring
national governments to reach speciªc political outcomes and helping to create
the conditions to make them possible.
C. Compelling Action by National Governments
The effectiveness of international law in responding to new transnational
threats will, to an ever greater degree, require the active cooperation of national institutions. Despite the proliferation of international courts and tribunals,67 national governments have retained the nearly exclusive use of
their instruments of coercive authority. In most cases, national governments
alone can use the police power, a national judiciary, or the military—the tools
necessary to address transnational threats before they grow and spread. In
many cases, backstopping and strengthening domestic institutions will be
sufªcient to ensure that national governments use their power to address present and potential dangers. At times, however, domestic governments may
be unwilling to use these institutions, either due to differing perceptions of
national interest, a lack of political will, or inªghting within governments
themselves. In these cases, international law can be effective only by ªnding

65. For a discussion of potential problems this may pose for domestic democratic processes, see infra
text accompanying notes 85–86; cf. Cutis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International
Human Rights Litigation, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2129, 2130 (1999) (discussing the “fundamental issue of
whether any international criminal process is appropriate when a nation, like Chile, has addressed the
human rights abuses of a prior regime through a domestic political compromise that facilitated a transition to democracy”). One of the authors, however, has argued that such domestic compromises should not
be given extraterritorial respect where they lack domestic legitimacy. See William W. Burke-White,
Reframing Impunity: Applying Liberal International Law Theory to an Analysis of Amnesty Legislation, 42
Harv. Int’l L.J. 467 (2001).
66. Obviously, where the state in question has rejected the authority of the international tribunal or
failed to ratify its Statute, such as the U.S. policy toward the ICC, none of these effects may materialize.
67. See generally Christian Tomuschat, International Courts and Tribunals, 1 Encyclopedia of Public
International Law 92–99 (Rudolph Dolzer et al. eds., 1981).
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new ways to ensure that national governments actually use the tools at their
disposal to address such threats before they spread.
International legal rules have long sought to constrain or mandate the behavior of states toward other states and toward other states’ citizens. More
recently, international treaties have required national governments to enact
domestic legislation of various sorts, such as the domestic criminalization of
certain transnational acts.68 The type of compulsion described here, however,
speciªcally directs domestic government institutions to go about what was
formerly purely domestic business in particular ways. And it does so not by
speciªc agreement on particular legal obligations that must then be domestically implemented, but rather by establishing general goals and requiring
domestic governments to achieve them through a broad range of measures.
EU directives work this way; in U.S. law, however, Congress is speciªcally
prohibited from imposing broad general mandates requiring individual
states to devise and pass speciªc legislation to achieve them.69
The use of international law to combat terrorism immediately after September 11, 2001, is a prime example of how speciªc obligations can be imposed on U.N. member states that they can fulªll only by directing domestic institutions to act in speciªc ways at the national level. U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1373, for example, requires states to “prevent the commission of terrorist acts” and “deny safe haven to those who ªnance [or] plan
. . . terrorist acts.”70 The resolution demands, among other things, the domestic criminalization of the ªnancing of terrorism, freezing of terrorist assets by national authorities, use of domestic courts to bring to justice those
involved in terrorist acts, and ratiªcation by domestic authorities of relevant
anti-terrorism conventions.71
The White House describes Resolution 1373 as setting “new, strict standards for all states to meet in the global war against terrorism.”72 Likewise,
the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (“Financing Convention”) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (“Bombing Convention”) require states to take
concrete domestic action. The Financing Convention obliges states to “take
appropriate measures . . . for the . . . seizure of any funds used or allocated

68. For example, many treaties in the area of international criminal law require criminalization of certain behavior at the national level. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide art. 5, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 4, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988),
1465 U.N.T.S. 113.
69. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)) (holding Congress may not “commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program”).
70. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 2(c)–(d), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
71. Id.
72. The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 13 (2003), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf.
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for” the ªnancing of terrorism,73 while the Bombing Convention requires
domestic criminalization of terrorist acts and the afªrmative use of national
judicial institutions to bring to justice the perpetrators of terrorist acts.74
Resolution 1373 links both the compelling and strengthening functions
of the international legal system. Beyond merely mandating domestic action,
the resolution establishes a Counter-Terrorism Committee that is tasked with
monitoring the implementation of the resolution and increasing the “ability
of States to ªght terrorism.”75 The Committee requires regular reporting by
states of steps taken to comply with Resolution 1373 and provides expert
advice on issues ranging from legislative drafting to customs requirements
and policing.76 Working jointly with international, regional, and sub-regional
organizations, the Committee shares “codes, standards and best practices in
their areas of competence.”77 In addition, the Committee makes available a
database of technical assistance and a team of expert advisors to assist states
in compliance.78 By April 2005, at least one report had been received from
all 191 member states; the Secretary-General has described state cooperation
with the Committee to date as “unprecedented and exemplary.”79
The Security Council’s recent initiatives in the area of non-proliferation
have imposed similar obligations on national governments and their respective sub-state institutions to take afªrmative domestic action. Security Council
Resolution 1540, for example, requires states to adopt national legislation
prohibiting the manufacture or possession of weapons of mass destruction by
nonstate actors and to establish export control regulations and physical protection regimes for weapons and related technologies.80 While not going as
far as the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Security Council again recognized the importance of capacity-building in ensuring domestic action and invited states to offer assistance and resources to one another.81
Likewise, functional international organizations such as the International
Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) have compelled states to act through their
own institutions. IAEA Safeguards Agreements with nuclear states, for ex-

73. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 54/109,
¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999).
74. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res. 52/164, ¶¶ 5–7,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 (Dec. 15, 1997).
75. Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/ (last visited Feb. 26,
2006).
76. CTC: About the CTC—How Does the CTC Work with States?, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/
committees/1373/work.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
77. CTC: Assistance to States—Working Together to Raise State Capacity, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/
committees/1373/capacity.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
78. CTC: Assistance to States—How Can the CTC Help States?, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/
1373/help.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
79. Id.
80. S.C. Res. 1540, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
81. Id. ¶ 7.
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ample, require a national system of materials controls and the use of particular accounting mechanisms.82
Admittedly, these new functions of international law may not always provide sufªcient leverage to produce desired outcomes of state behavior or consistent compliance with international legal obligations. Particularly where
states have purposefully excluded themselves from international institutions
or lack the will to comply (such as is arguably the situation with the alleged
Iranian nuclear weapons program in 2006), resort to other methods—ranging
from diplomatic isolation to economic sanctions and, in extreme cases, the
use of military force—may be needed. In such hard cases, the best hope of international law is simply to push states toward participation in international
institutions and the international legal system generally so that the functions of
international law identiªed here can take hold and inºuence state behavior
and outcomes.83
To effectively respond to new international threats, international legal rules
must penetrate the surface of the sovereign state by requiring governments
to take speciªc domestic actions to meet speciªed targets. Sometimes simple
backstopping of national institutions may be sufªcient to accomplish this
task. In other circumstances, assistance and the bolstering of weak state capacity may be an essential prerequisite. At yet other times, international law
may have to actively compel state action. When it does so, it once again seeks to
alter the political choices of national governments and to compel states to
utilize their national institutions in new ways.
The most effective approach will often involve some combination of all
three functions of international law. Leaders and legislators should then be held
accountable by both their peers and their publics for whether and how their
governments respond.
III. The Dangers of Using International Law To Shape and
Inºuence Domestic Politics
On one level, using international law to build the will and capacity of
states to act domestically offers great opportunities to enhance the effectiveness of the international legal system. National governments will have new
incentives to act. Domestic institutions will grow stronger, and can be harnessed in pursuit of international objectives. States can thus respond to transnational threats more effectively and efªciently.
Yet each of the new functions of the international system suggested here—
backstopping, strengthening, and compelling—is a double-edged sword.
Backstopping national institutions can be counterproductive to the degree
82. See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy
Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States, Nov. 18, 1977, 32.3 U.S.T. 3059.
83. This goal of inclusion reºects Chayes and Chayes’s recognition of the new sovereignty as a right to
be included in international institutions, rather than the traditional right to exclude other states from
interference. See generally Chayes & Chayes, supra note 49.
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states may defer to an international forum as a less politically and ªnancially
costly alternative to national action.84 Well-intentioned efforts to help, often
through NGOs as well as international institutions, can end up weakening
local government actors by siphoning off both funds and personnel. The process
of strengthening domestic institutions, if not properly designed and implemented, can also squeeze out local domestic capacity.85 Finally, and most
dangerously, by compelling national action, the international legal system may
undermine local democratic processes and prevent domestic experimentation
with alternate approaches.86
The most signiªcant danger inherent in these new functions of international law, however, lies in the potential of national governments to co-opt
the force of international law to serve their own objectives. One of the modern limits to Westphalian concepts of sovereignty is the obligations imposed
by international law—particularly human rights law—on the conduct of states
toward their own citizens. Yet, by strengthening state capacity, international
law may actually make states more effective at the very repression and abuse
the interference challenge seeks to overcome. Similarly, by compelling state
action, international law may give national governments new license to undertake otherwise illegal or unjust policies. Where critical values such as
human rights and state security are seen to be in conºict, international legal
compulsion of policies that favor one value may come at the expense of the
other. This tension is particularly problematic where a repressive regime is
able to use compulsion at the international level as a cover or an excuse to
undertake its own domestic policies that may undermine legitimate opposition groups and violate citizens’ rights.
Nowhere is this danger more apparent than in the legal compulsion of
counter-terrorism activity. Mary Robinson, former U.N. high commissioner
for human rights, observes: “Repressive new laws and detention practices have
been introduced in a signiªcant number of countries, all broadly justiªed by
the new international war on terrorism.”87 Similarly, Kim Scheppele has documented the number of exceptions to international and domestic legal protec84. One of the authors has described this as a moral hazard problem. See William W. Burke-White,
Multi-Level Global Governance in the Enforcement of International Criminal Law ch. 4 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge) (on ªle with author). The most obvious example of
this is the government of Uganda’s self-referral to the ICC concerning the Lords Resistance Army. Press
Release, International Criminal Court, President of Uganda Refers Situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC (Jan. 29, 2004), http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=16.html.
In all likelihood, the Ugandan government could have addressed this situation domestically if it had not
had the option of referring the situation to the ICC.
85. Fukuyama argues that “[t]he international community, including the vast numbers of NGOs that
are an intimate part of it, comes so richly endowed and full of capabilities that it tends to crowd out
rather than complement the extremely weak state capacities of the targeted countries.” See Fukuyama,
supra note 14, at 103.
86. For a discussion of the importance of such domestic experimentation, see Michael C. Dorf &
Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267 (1998).
87. Mary Robinson, Shaping Globalization: The Role of Human Rights, 19 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 12
(2003).
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tions that states have invoked under the cover of ªghting terrorism.88 Among
the worst offenders, according to Human Rights First, are Tanzania, Indonesia, Russia, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan, each of which has undertaken “draconian anti-terrorism laws” that compromise human rights and strengthen the
hand of government vis-à-vis opposition groups.89
If these new purposes of international law are to be both effective and just,
the goal must be to maximize the beneªts of the backstopping, strengthening, and compelling functions while avoiding the dangers evident in the
counter-terrorism case. The theoretical base of these new functions of international law is that domestic institutions can be used to further international
legal objectives. Yet these same institutions can become sources of abuse by
national governments. The challenge, then, is to design rules that will harness the strengths of well-functioning domestic institutions while targeting
and restricting the reach of abusive ones.
One way of making such distinctions is for international law to consider
directly the quality of domestic institutions. States with robust and independent institutions, strong constitutional frameworks, transparent political processes, and embedded systems of checks and balances are least likely to appropriate international law for their own purposes and engage or abuse their
newfound power. In these states, domestic legal protections and other institutions within the national government can prevent abuse or counter-balance
the strength of other institutions. Abuses will still occur in states with good
institutional frameworks; however, the assumption built into institutions
like the ICC is that when abuses do occur in a well-governed state, that state’s
own domestic system will provide an internal correction mechanism. It is
these states with independent and transparent domestic institutions that should
be most receptive to the new functions of the international legal system. European states, at least, largely bear out this prediction.
The problem, of course, is that it is often the states that lack institutional
independence and embedded checks and balances that are most in need of
capacity-building or compulsion to address threats and challenges at home
before they spread. Where international law does target such states, international rules, regimes, and institutions will have to be designed to address both
the capacity and quality of domestic governance. Checks and balances will
have to be embedded into the system itself, pushing not only for particular
substantive outcomes, but also for legitimate domestic processes to achieve
those goals. Similarly, international regimes themselves will have to balance
a range of competing values—such as human rights and national security—
rather than focus on one particular goal when compelling state action.

88. See Kim L. Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U.
Pa. J. Const. L. 1001 (2000).
89. Human Rights First, Imbalance of Powers: How Changes to U.S. Law and Policy
Since 9/11 Erode Human Rights and Civil Liberties 76–79 (2003).
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Finally, as is already becoming apparent, both this overall conception of
international law and the speciªc functions described here will meet with
ªerce resistance from states with very strong domestic legal systems, such as
the United States, and from many states with very weak legal systems but
strong political rulers. European states, as noted above, are accustomed to
daily “soft intervention.” Other states, however, will be far less comfortable
with such intervention. The United States will not be alone here, but it may
well ªnd itself with a number of unsavory bedfellows. On the other hand,
many European powers may ªnd it more difªcult than they expect to promote
an EU-inspired model of pooled sovereignty among wary former colonies.
IV. International Law, Domestic Politics
International lawyers and political scientists alike have long been fascinated with the blurring of the boundaries between domestic and international
rules and institutions. In 1956, Philip Jessup made a hegemonic move, claiming for international lawyers not only the classic domain of international law,
but also “all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national
frontiers,” which he dubbed “transnational law.”90 Forty-ªve years later,
then-Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, a relative newcomer to the world of international law, observed: “[I]nternational law is no longer conªned in relevance to a few treaties and business agreements. Rather, it . . . regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers.”91
In political science, James Rosenau has popularized the concept of the
“domestic-foreign frontier.”92 On this frontier, “domestic and foreign issues
converge, intermesh, or otherwise become indistinguishable.”93 In his conception, whereas a boundary is an imaginary line, a frontier is “a new and
wide political space . . . continuously shifting, widening, and narrowing, simultaneously undergoing erosion with respect to many issues and reinforcement with respect
to others[.]”94 What Rosenau ªnds striking about relations along this frontier
is that individuals work out a wide range of solutions to various problems
through a mix of domestic and international rules, rather than “through the
nation-state system.”95
Our proposition is actually a quite different one. We endorse the division
between domestic and international affairs, at least conceptually. Although

90. Phillip Jessup, Transnational Law 2 (1956).
91. Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address at the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 16, 2002), in 96 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 348, 350 (2002).
92. Rosenau observes that “[d]omestic and foreign affairs have always formed a seamless web . . . .
[W]e can no longer allow the domestic-foreign boundary to confound our understanding of world affairs.” James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a
Turbulent World 4 (1997).
93. Id. at 5.
94. Id. at 4–5 (emphasis added).
95. See id. at 5–6; see also Mathias Albert & Lothar Brock, Debordering the World of States: New Spaces in
International Relations, 35 New Pol. Sci. 69 (1996).
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it is quite possible, indeed likely, that international law is expanding to include all sorts of rules and institutions that have a hybrid domesticinternational character, as well as domestic rules reaching beyond borders,
we suggest that traditional public international law, meaning treaties and
custom operating among nations in their mutual relations, has a distinct identity and a distinct set of functions. We simply argue that those functions are
changing fast.
Our claim “that the future of international law is domestic” refers not
simply to domestic law but to domestic politics. More precisely, the future of
international law lies in its ability to affect, inºuence, bolster, backstop, and
even mandate speciªc actors in domestic politics. International rules and
institutions will and should be designed as a set of spurs and checks on domestic political actors to ensure that they do what they should be doing anyway,
that is, what they have already committed to do in their domestic constitutions and laws.
In this conception, it is perfectly acceptable to continue to distinguish concretely between an “international” and a “domestic” sphere, even as we recognize that the boundary between them has blurred and that they intersect
and even conºict in growing ways. Indeed, it is valuable for domestic political actors—the prosecutors trying to bring a former government ofªcial to
justice, the judges seeking to resist executive pressure to decide a case a particular way, the parliamentary faction trying to ªght global warming—to be
able to point to a mandate, consequence, or spur from a distinct and separate
political space. The result will be ever more elaborate two-level games,96 but
each game will remain on its own board, no matter how complex and dense
the links between them.
What must change profoundly, however, is the legitimacy of allowing the
architects of international rules and institutions to look within the domestic
political sphere of all states actually and hypothetically subject to the rule or
institution in question. This scrutiny cannot be undertaken with reference to
speciªc parties and actors in actual states, but rather must be based on data
culled from history and the social sciences about the likely incentives of those
parties and actors in varying circumstances. The critical question must be
how the content of speciªc rules and the processes and procedures of institutions are likely to interact with, inºuence, or even change these incentives.
In consequence, the very concept of sovereignty will have to adapt to embrace, rather than reject, the inºuence of international rules and institutions
on domestic political processes. A harbinger of this shift is the new doctrine
of the responsibility to protect. The responsibility to protect ªrst emerged
from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(“ICISS”), headed by former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans and

96. See generally Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 Int’l
Org. 427 (1988).
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Special Advisor to the U.N. Secretary-General Mohamed Sahnoun.97 In December 2001 the ICISS issued an important and inºuential report entitled
“The Responsibility to Protect,” which essentially called for updating the U.N.
Charter to incorporate a new understanding of sovereignty.98
In the Commission’s conception, the core meaning of U.N. membership
has shifted from “the ªnal symbol of independent sovereign statehood and thus
the seal of acceptance into the community of nations,”99 to recognition of a
state “as a responsible member of the community of nations.”100 Nations are
free to choose whether or not to sign the Charter; if they do, however, they
must accept the “responsibilities of membership ºowing from their signature.”101 According to the ICISS, “[t]here is no transfer or dilution of state
sovereignty. But there is a necessary re-characterization involved: from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and
external duties.”102 Internally, a government has a responsibility to respect
the dignity and basic rights of its citizens; externally, it has a responsibility
to respect the sovereignty of other states.
Further, the ICISS places the responsibility to protect on both the state
and on the international community as a whole. The ICISS insists that an
individual state has the primary responsibility to protect the individuals
within it.103 However, where the state fails in that responsibility, a secondary
responsibility falls on the international community acting through the
United Nations. Thus, “where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result
of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention
yields to the international responsibility to protect.”104

97. In September 1999, Koª Annan called on all U.N. members at the opening of the General Assembly to “reach consensus—not only on the principle that massive and systematic violations of human
rights must be checked, wherever they take place, but also on ways of deciding what action is necessary,
and when, and by whom.” Koª Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, Address Before the U.N. General
Assembly (Sept. 20, 1999), in Koª Annan, The Question of Intervention: Statements by the
Secretary-General (1999).
98. Int’l Comm’n on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect:
Report of the ICISS (2001). The ICISS began from the premise that “in key respects . . . the mandates
and capacity of international institutions have not kept pace with international needs or modern expectations.” Id. ¶ 1.11. More speciªcally, the ICISS argued that the intense debate over military protection for
humanitarian purposes ºowed from a “critical gap” between the immense and unavoidable reality of mass
human suffering and the existing rules and mechanisms for managing world order. At the same time, it
noted a widening gap between the rules and the principles of the Charter regarding non-interference in
the domestic affairs of member nations and actual state practice as it has evolved since 1945. The ICISS
frames the “responsibility to protect” as an “emerging principle” of customary international law—not yet
existing as law but already supported both by state practice and a wide variety of legal sources. See id.
¶¶ 2.24–2.27.
99. Id. ¶ 2.11.
100. Id. ¶ 2.14.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id. ¶ 2.29.
104. Id. at XI.
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These shifts may seem dramatic; they are certainly bold. But in the view
of a group of leading European policy thinkers asked to consider how the EU
should respond to the U.N. Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel Report on
Threats, Challenges, and Change, EU states should go considerably further.
They should “[p]romote ‘the Responsibility to Protect,’ while also reframing
the sovereignty debate to cover a principle of both enhancing effective and legitimate sovereignty of weak states, (through international assistance) and
conditioning sovereignty on state behavior.”105
International law and the international community itself are thus coming
to have not only the right but in many cases also the obligation to intervene
in and inºuence what were previously the exclusive jurisdiction and political
processes of national governments. By strengthening, backstopping, and compelling action at the national level, the international legal system has powerful tools at its disposal to alter domestic political outcomes. The future of
international law ultimately depends on the future of international politics:
the problems raised and the aspirations generated. If those problems and aspirations arise from within states rather than between them, international law
must follow suit to shape and regulate domestic government institutions. But if
it is simultaneously to remain a distinct body of international law, it must
develop a whole new set of effective relationships with those institutions and
with entire bodies of domestic law.
The EU is a great experiment with precisely this type of system, although
one underpinned by a unique history and culture generating the necessary
domestic political will and economic and social forces. The world is not likely
to replicate this experience in terms of actual political and economic integration monitored by coercive supranational institutions. But to the extent that
the European way of law uses international law to transform and buttress
domestic political institutions, it is a model for how international law can
function, and in our view, will and must function to address twenty-ªrstcentury international challenges.

105. Eide, supra note 24, at 9.

